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INTRODUCTION 
Laws governing infant adoption in the United States have 
undergone dramatic changes over the past several decades. A number of 
high-profile legal custody battles1 between birthparents and adoptive 
parents in the late 1980s and early 1990s created media spectacle followed 
by public outcry.2 Courts seemed to be torn between conflicting legal goals: 
the solidly established right to parent formed by the biological bond 
between a person and his or her natural offspring, enforceability of contract 
                                                
 1. For example, in Petition of Doe, 638 N.E.2d 181 (Ill. 1994), the Illinois Supreme 
Court reversed the findings of the trial court, returning four-year-old “Baby Richard” to his 
natural father after finding that the adoptive parents and their attorney had not made 
sufficient effort to notify him of the adoption proceedings. The trial court had found that the 
natural father’s consent to adoption was not needed when he failed to show interest in the 
child during the first 30 days of the child’s life, despite the fact that he was out of the 
country during the pregnancy and the child’s mother had told him that the child had died. 
The “Baby Richard” case became the impetus for Illinois’ putative father registry. Likewise, 
Matter of Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1998), created fanfare when a surrogacy contract 
conflicted with public policy in allowing monetary gain through adoption. The natural father 
did not have a custody right superseding the rights of the surrogate mother through 
biological connection alone, but a best interests of the child analysis, particularly in light of 
surrogate mother’s willingness to sell her story to the media, justified awarding custody to 
the natural father, with visitation granted to the surrogate mother. Finally, “Baby Jessica” 
was taken from her adoptive home at the age of two and a half after the Supreme Court of 
Michigan held in In re Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649 (Mich. 1993), that neither the adoptive 
parents nor the child had standing to demand a best interests hearing, but that such a hearing 
would only be considered on determination of unfitness of the natural parents. There was 
evidence that the adoption attorney obtained the birthmother’s consent before expiration of 
the 72-hour statutory waiting period, and that the birthfather was not notified of the adoption 
proceedings. The adoptive parents were treated as third-party strangers to the child, though 
their home was the only home she had known her entire life. 
 2. See, e.g., Darlene Gavron Stevens, Adoption Reformers Target Baby Richard 
Case, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 6, 1994, § 2, at 1; Janan Hanna, 1 Year Later, Legacy of Baby Richard 
Case Is Fear, CHI. TRIB., April 29, 1996, § 1, at 1 (“What if the birth parents change their 
mind? What if a biological father resurfaces and a judge invalidates the adoption? Would it 
be less risky to adopt from a foreign country?”); Iver Peterson, Baby M’s Future, N.Y. 
TIMES, April 5, 1987, § 4, at 1 (“Last week, in a decision that created law in the legislative 
vacuum surrounding surrogate motherhood, Judge Harvey R. Sorkow of New Jersey 
Superior Court awarded custody of one-year-old Baby M to William Stern, the child’s 
natural father, and his wife, Elizabeth. He stripped Mary Beth Whitehead, the surrogate 
mother, of all parental rights, and ruled that the contract she had signed with the Sterns—and 
reneged on—was legal,” despite material misrepresentations by the Sterns); Justice for All in 
the Baby M Case, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1988, at A26 (“At a stroke, New Jersey’s Supreme 
Court brought clarity and justice to the Baby M case, which so tormented the nation last 
spring: Mary Beth Whitehead-Gould retains her rights as a parent. William Stern and his 
wife retain the right to raise his child. New Jersey acquires a convincing judgment that a 
‘surrogate parent’ contract for money amounts to an illegal bill of sale for a baby.”); Jon D. 
Hull, The Ties That Traumatize, TIME MAG., April 12, 1993, at 48 (“Sometime before 
midnight on April 20, two-year-old Jessica DeBoer of Ann Arbor, Michigan, is scheduled to 
disappear, leaving behind a heartbroken couple she calls Mommy and Daddy, a dog named 
Miles, her yellow bedroom and just about everything she has ever known . . . to begin life 
anew as Anna Lee Schmidt.”). 
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in adoption and surrogacy agreements, and an ever-evolving “best interests 
of the child” determination which, at times, seemed to give the courts an ad 
hoc power to override all other considerations.3 No uniform approach to 
adoption of infants exists among the fifty states. In the midst of heightened 
public awareness of adoption controversy, the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (“Uniform Law Commission”) 
submitted its 1994 version of the Uniform Adoption Act.4 The Act has been 
the subject of much commentary over the past two decades, but has only 
been enacted in one state, and the current consent and revocation statutes in 
that jurisdiction do not reflect their counterparts in the Uniform Adoption 
Act.5 
In particular, the high-profile cases that captured media attention 
and involved withdrawal—or attempted withdrawal—of birthparent consent 
to adoption seem to have had more impact on the shaping of subsequent 
adoption legislation governing birthparent consent and revocation of 
birthparent consent than the approach taken by the Uniform Law 
Commission. For example, in 2007 the Supreme Court of Illinois credited 
the “Baby Richard” case from 19946 with prompting the legislature to 
change Illinois adoption laws and to create the state’s putative father 
registry.7 The purpose of the resulting laws was to “give protection to both 
the biological parents and the adoptive parents . . . not jeopardizing either 
group.”8 “[T]he thrust of the Bill . . . is to put some type of . . . finality and 
some type of predictability into our adoption laws as they exist right now.”9 
Two decades later, though overhaul of adoption laws across the 
United States has been nearly universal, there is still no uniformity among 
the states in approach to voluntary relinquishment of parental rights: the 
very issue at the heart of the controversial cases that sparked reform.10 This 
Note attempts to track the development of domestic adoption laws as they 
affect birthparent consent in infant adoptions, the competing policies 
driving these developments, and the way states have attempted to reconcile 
that friction. Part I of this Note provides an underpinning of adoption 
                                                
 3. Carrie L. Wambaugh, Biology Is Important, But Does Not Necessarily Always 
Constitute a “Family”: A Brief Survey of the Uniform Adoption Act, 32 AKRON L. REV. 791, 
828 (1999) (“[T]here is no mandatory overall rule of construction for applying the ‘best 
interests’ standard”). 
 4. UNIF. ADOPTION ACT, 9 U.L.A. 11 (Supp. 2013). The 1994 version replaced the 
original 1953 Act and its 1969 amended version. 
 5. See John J. Sampson, Uniform Family Laws and Model Acts, 42 FAM. L.Q. 673, 
684 (2008); see also UNIF. ADOPTION ACT, 9 U.L.A. 11–15. 
 6. See supra note 1. 
 7. J.S.A. v. M.H., 863 N.E.2d 236, 251 (Ill. 2007). 
 8. Id. (quoting The 88th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, June 30, 1994, at 115 
(statement of Rep. Wojcik)) (brackets omitted). 
 9. Id. (quoting The 88th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, June 30, 1994, at 115 
(statement of Rep. Dart)). 
 10. See infra APPENDIX A: Survey of Relevant Consent and Revocation Statutes by 
State (describing the disparity in approaches of consent and revocation statutes). 
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terminology by outlining the actors involved, the basic elements required 
for infant adoption in the United States, and how birthparent consent fits in 
the mix. Part II gives a brief historical background of adoption statutes in 
the United States, including more recent attempts at uniformity in adoption 
laws across the fifty states. In Part III, this Note addresses competing policy 
interests and the friction that arises among the dueling rights of the various 
actors in the adoption process. Part III also attempts to grasp a firm 
definition of the ever-elusive “best interests of the child” standard, taking 
the position that the child’s interest in stability and permanency must be the 
ultimate goal of the law in the adoption context. Part IV categorizes current 
statutes across the fifty states into three distinct groups, drawing heavily on 
data compiled in APPENDIX A concerning certain identified criteria in each 
state’s adoption laws. Finally, Part V proposes a model statute that falls 
squarely into the most conservative of these categories, balancing the 
interests and rights of the various actors with the best interests of the child 
being held paramount. The proposal argues, first, for only a very brief delay 
of birthparent consent after the child’s birth and, second, for no subsequent 
revocation period. Though the primary purpose of this limitation is stability 
for the child, this Note will show that this design best serves each of the 
other actors as well. 
I. ADOPTION IN GENERAL 
Fundamental to a discussion of reform to laws governing consent 
and revocation in adoption proceedings is identification of the actors 
involved. Adoption brings about a unique relationship for a limited—or in 
some cases, protracted—period of time between three distinct entities with 
varying and sometimes conflicting rights and interests. Commonly known 
among adoption professionals as the “adoption triad,” the parties to this 
relationship are the child, the birthparents, and the adoptive parents.11 
Various other players may become involved on behalf of one or more of 
these actors: the court, a state or private agency, or a lawyer. But the needs 
and rights of the members of the triad are what are at issue here. 
Joan Heifetz Hollinger, adoption advocate and co-drafter of the 
1994 Uniform Adoption Act, writes: 
Adoptive relationships have six principal elements, each of 
which is said to be a necessary legal prerequisite for, or a 
consequence of, adoption, or a socially and psychologically 
desirable characteristic of adoption. These are: (1) the 
necessity of parental consent from a child’s original 
parents—usually referred to as “birth parents”—or a sound 
basis for terminating parental rights, as a jurisdictional 
                                                
 11. See Adoption Triad, ADOPTION.COM, www.adoption.com/topics/adoption-triad 
(last visited Dec. 24, 2013). 
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prerequisite for an adoption proceeding; (2) selection of 
suitable adoptive parent(s) in order to serve the child’s best 
interests; (3) the characterization of adoption as a non-
contractual “gift” and not a bargained-for-exchange; (4) the 
“asserted-equivalence” doctrine, that an adoptive parent-
child relationship replaces “in all respects” the child’s 
relationship to her birth family; (5) the confidentiality of 
adoption proceedings and records; (6) the permanence and 
autonomy of adoptive relationships, subject to the same 
statutory and constitutional protections that would initially 
apply to a child’s original family.12 
It is to the first of these elements that this Note is dedicated, though each of 
the others certainly comes to bear in the analysis. While it is hardly possible 
to discuss child custody without, for example, bringing in a discussion of 
the “best interests of the child” standard, of primary significance, at least in 
its status as a threshold matter if not in importance, is the determination of 
birthparent consent to adoption, alternately referred to as voluntary 
relinquishment of parental rights: “Because of the fundamental nature of 
parental rights, the issue of the requirement of parental consent to an 
adoption is determined without regard for the best interests of the child.”13 
Adoption proceedings can only commence if parental rights are first 
terminated, either voluntarily by consent or relinquishment, or involuntarily 
through a state-initiated termination proceeding for unfitness.14 
“[E]ver since the first adoption statutes were enacted in the 1850s, 
parental consent, or a legitimate reason for dispensing with the need for 
consent, has been an essential, albeit not a sufficient, jurisdictional 
prerequisite for a valid adoption.”15 But many questions revolving around 
birthparent consent remain unanswered: Who must give consent? When is a 
birthfather’s consent required? When can consent be given, and to whom? 
Is consent final at the moment it is given, or should there be a period of 
time for the birthparent to change his or her mind? And what procedures 
should be implemented to guard against abuse of birthparent vulnerability 
during the time of consent? 
                                                
 12. Joan Heifetz Hollinger, State and Federal Adoption Laws, in FAMILIES BY LAW: 
AN ADOPTION READER 37, 38–39 (Naomi R. Cahn & Joan Heifetz Hollinger eds., 2004). 
 13. In re Adoption of T.L.C., 46 P.3d 863, 870 (Wyo. 2002) (citations omitted). 
 14. Id. at 868. 
 15. Naomi R. Cahn & Joan Heifetz Hollinger, Introduction to FAMILIES BY LAW: AN 
ADOPTION READER, supra note 12, at 4. 
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II. THE HISTORIC PERSPECTIVE 
Adoption was not a recognized practice under British common 
law.16 Rather, orphans were cared for through indentured servitude, 
apprenticeships, or as wards of the state in publicly funded orphanages.17 
These practices were subsequently imported to America and held sway 
through much of the nineteenth century.18 But statutes enabling adoption 
began to be enacted in many states in response to specific individual needs 
arising in legislative petitions: particularly, petitions for name change and 
inheritance rights for wards of individuals unrelated or tenuously related by 
blood.19 These were particularized, rather than general statutes, and only 
effective for the particular private adoption each authorized.20 In 1850, 
Texas enacted a more generalized statute that allowed a person to file an 
adoption petition with the court, but it only covered inheritance rights in its 
scope.21 
Experts recognize An Act to Provide for the Adoption of Children, 
enacted by the Massachusetts legislature in 1851, as the first modern 
American adoption statute.22 The Act provided for a much broader 
treatment of adoption, including a comprehensive look at such modern 
adoption concepts as who may adopt, who may be adopted, the necessity 
for consent in writing, a prohibition against a married person adopting a 
child without his spouse’s assent, filing of an adoption petition with the 
court, a final decree of adoption issued by the court, rights and status of the 
adopted child as a full member of the adoptive family “as if such child had 
been born in lawful wedlock of such parents,” and severance of birthparent 
rights.23 Though the Act makes no mention of a “best interests of the child” 
                                                
 16. Janet Hopkins Dickson, Comment, The Emerging Rights of Adoptive Parents: 
Substance or Specter?, 38 UCLA L. REV. 917, 923 (1991). 
 17. Id. Enter the picture of Dickens’ novels and Victorian mothers stealing away in the 
night, leaving their infants in orphanage doorways to be cared for. 
 18. Id. 
 19. See Naomi R. Cahn, Perfect Substitutes or the Real Thing?, in FAMILIES BY LAW: 
AN ADOPTION READER 19, supra note 12, at 19–20 [hereinafter Cahn, Perfect Substitutes]. 
 20. Id. at 20. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 22–23. 
 23. The Act reads, in its entirety: 
BE it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives, in General 
Court assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows: 
Sect. 1. Any inhabitant of this Commonwealth may petition the judge of 
probate, in the county wherein he or she may reside, for leave to adopt a 
child not his or her own by birth. 
Sect. 2. If both or either of the parents of such child shall be living, they 
or the survivor of them, as the case may be, shall consent in writing to 
such adoption: if neither parent be living, such consent may be given by 
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standard, many of the elements reviewed in a modern best interests analysis 
are present in its language, and subsequent legislation modeled after the 
Massachusetts Act began to explicitly include considerations for the 
welfare of the child.24 
                                                                                                             
the legal guardian of such child; if there be no legal guardian, no father 
nor mother, the next of kin of such child within the State may give such 
consent; and if there be no such next of kin, the judge of probate may 
appoint some discreet and suitable person to act in the proceedings as the 
next friend of such child, and give or withhold such consent. 
Sect. 3. If the child be of the age of fourteen years or upwards, the 
adoption shall not be made without his or her consent. 
Sect. 4. No petition by a person having a lawful wife shall be allowed 
unless such wife shall join therein, and no woman having a lawful 
husband shall be competent to present and prosecute such petition. 
Sect. 5. If, upon such petition, so presented and consented to as 
aforesaid, the judge of probate shall be satisfied of the identity and 
relations of the persons, and that the petitioner, or, in case of husband 
and wife, the petitioners, are of sufficient ability to bring up the child, 
and furnish suitable nurture and education, having reference to the 
degree and condition of its parents, and that it is fit and proper that such 
adoption should take effect, he shall make a decree setting forth the said 
facts, and ordering that, from and after the date of the decree, such child 
should be deemed and taken, to all legal intents and purposes, the child 
of the petitioner or petitioners. 
Sect. 6. A child so adopted, as aforesaid, shall be deemed, for the 
purposes of inheritance and succession by such child, custody of the 
person and right of obedience by such parent or parents by adoption, and 
all other legal consequences and incidents of the natural relation of 
parents and children, the same to all intents and purposes as if such child 
had been born in lawful wedlock of such parents or parent by adoption, 
saving only that such child shall not be deemed capable of taking 
property expressly limited to the heirs of the body or bodies of such 
petitioner or petitioners. 
Sect. 7. The natural parent or parents of such child shall be deprived, by 
such decree of adoption, of all legal rights whatsoever as respects such 
child; and such child shall be freed from all legal obligations of 
maintenance and obedience, as respects such natural parent or parents. 
Sect. 8. Any petitioner, or any child which is the subject of such a 
petition, by any next friend, may claim and prosecute an appeal to the 
supreme judicial court from such decree of the judge of probate, in like 
manner and with the like effect as such appeals may now be claimed and 
prosecuted in cases of wills, saying only that in no case shall any bond 
be required of, nor any costs awarded against, such child or its next 
friend so appealing. [Approved by the Governor, May 24, 1851.] 
 
Law of May 24, 1851, ch. 324, 1851 Mass. Acts 815. 
 24. Cahn, Perfect Substitutes, supra note 19, at 23. 
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As modern adoption statutes developed in all fifty states through 
the latter part of the nineteenth and early part of the twentieth centuries, 
legislators sought to satisfy competing interests among the various actors, 
but with the primary goals being the child’s best interests and the protection 
of biological parents’ constitutional rights in the securing of informed, 
voluntary consent.25 The results, however, were varied as the states’ 
approaches to adoption regulation sought to reconcile the complex and 
“conflicting mixture of competing rights” that ultimately led to the series of 
highly-publicized decisions in various jurisdictions outlined above.26 Such 
anomalies raised public awareness and sparked a cry for reform in 
legislatures across the United States. 
Also, until the latter part of the twentieth century, society found 
acceptable certain harsh language to describe each member of the adoption 
triad: The child was considered a “bastard” or “illegitimate,” the 
birthmother was “promiscuous” or “irresponsible,” and the adoptive family 
was “barren.”27 While the language has softened, much of the stereotype 
and echoes of the stigma remain.28 In modern adoption, vestiges of 
suspicion in public opinion linger, bleeding over into legislation which is 
often overly wary of agency practice, adoptive and birthparent motives, and 
a “gray market” view of much of adoption culture.29 
In the wake of cries for reform and a need to renew public 
sentiment about the institution of adoption, two separate and very different 
movements developed, each attempting to reconcile variance in adoption 
law across the United States: The Uniform Adoption Act (“UAA”)30 and 
The Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (“ICPC”).31 The UAA 
was first enacted in 1953 and amended for the last time in 1994.32 The 1994 
                                                
 25. See Robin DuRocher, Balancing Competing Interests in Post-Placement Adoption 
Custody Disputes: How Do the Scales of Justice Weigh the Rights of Biological Parents, 
Adoptive Parents, and Children?, 15 J. LEGAL MED. 305, 309 (1994). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Dickson, supra note 16, at 926. 
 28. Id. 
 29. See id. at 934 (implying that all adoptions, whether agency or independent, have 
been historically viewed through this skeptical lens); see also Independent Adoption, 
ADOPTION.COM, http://www.encyclopedia.adoption.com/entry/independent-adoption/180/ 
1.html (last visited Dec. 30, 2013). See generally Melinda Lucas, Adoption: Distinguishing 
Between Gray Market and Black Market Activities, 34 FAM. L.Q. 553–64 (2000) (discussing 
that independent adoption—adoption facilitated by an intermediary, such as an attorney, 
medical professional, member of the clergy, or other adoption facilitator, rather than a public 
or private adoption agency—is sometimes called “gray market adoption” (a play on the term 
“black market adoption” used to describe illegal activity) by its detractors). 
 30. UNIF. ADOPTION ACT, 9 U.L.A. 11 (Supp. 2013). 
 31. SECRETARIAT TO THE ASS’N OF ADM’RS OF THE INTERSTATE COMPACT ON THE 
PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN, AM. PUB. HUMAN SERV. ASS’N, GUIDE TO THE INTERSTATE 
COMPACT ON THE PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN 10 (2002), available at http://www.aphsa.org/ 
content/dam/AAICPC/PDF%20DOC/Resources/Guidebook_2002.pdf [hereinafter ICPC 
GUIDE]. 
 32. 9 U.L.A. 11, 133 (Supp. 2013). 
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amendment really constituted an entire rewrite of the Act.33 It was intended 
as “a comprehensive codification of adoption law, covering everything 
from birth parent consent to adoption records confidentiality.”34 
Commentators around the time of its final amendment hailed the 1994 Act 
as “a major initiative in the field of children’s rights”35 that “strives to 
provide some certainty in the quagmire of adoption law.”36 However, the 
UAA never received much support in state legislatures and was 
subsequently downgraded to a model act.37 
The ICPC is a statutory agreement initiated in 1974 that has been 
adopted and is currently utilized in all fifty states, as well as the District of 
Columbia and the Virgin Islands.38 It seeks to guarantee that certain agreed-
upon practices take place before a child is transported from one state to 
another.39 “The primary purpose of the ICPC is to ensure that children 
placed out-of-state are placed with care-givers who are safe, suitable and 
able to meet the child’s needs.”40 ICPC workers in each state involved in an 
adoption evaluate a checklist of requirements that must be met as well as 
the home study prepared for the adoption and other pertinent paperwork 
before approving the removal of the child from his or her state of birth.41 
While the ICPC does not resolve the issue of differences between adoption 
requirements in various states, it has for decades provided a means for 
working through the differences to provide as smooth a transition from one 
jurisdiction to the next as is possible in the current regime.42 Effectively, 
The ICPC has served as a stop-gap in the absence of uniformity among 
state adoption laws. 
                                                
 33. Sampson, supra note 5, at 684 (“Despite the innovation found in many of its 
provisions, the UAA immediately attracted controversy, not support. After quick enactment 
by a single state, it soon fell into obscurity. The main complaints were an excess of 
complexity, unacceptable alteration of known procedures, and the substantial length of the 
text. Downgraded to a model act, it remains available on the NCCUSL website for review.”). 
 34. Adoption Act (1994), UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, http://www.uniformlaws.org/ 
Act.aspx?title=Adoption%20Act%20%281994%29 (last visited Dec. 30, 2013). 
 35. Wambaugh, supra note 3, at 831. 
 36. Sarah Clarke Wixson, And Baby Makes Three: The Rights of the Child, the 
Adoptive Parents and the Biological Parents Under the Uniform Adoption Act, 33 IDAHO L. 
REV. 481, 497 (1997). 
 37. Sampson, supra note 5, at 684. 
 38. ICPC GUIDE, supra note 31, at 3. 
 39. Id. at 3–4. 
 40. ICPC FAQ, AM. PUB. HUMAN SERV. ASS’N, http://www.icpc.aphsa.org/content/ 
AAICPC/en/resources/ICPCFAQ.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2014). 
 41. ICPC GUIDE, supra note 31, at 4–5. 
 42. See generally ICPC GUIDE, supra note 31. 
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III. POLICY CONCERNS: COMPETING INTERESTS  
AND RIGHTS OF THE VARIOUS ACTORS 
One commentator noted, “Two principal and widely accepted goals 
of domestic infant adoption are (1) preventing the unnecessary separation of 
family members by ensuring that birth parents make informed and 
deliberate decisions and (2) protecting the finality of adoptive 
placements.”43 However, as this argument is framed, it becomes necessary 
to be ever mindful of a tendency to slip into a view of the child as 
belonging, in a proprietary sense, to one set of parents or the other. Stability 
and permanency and a sense of belonging are essential to the psychological 
well-being of a child.44 While the parenting instinct is a natural desire to 
protect those in our care who are most vulnerable, danger lies in the 
parental tendency to become possessive to the point of overshooting the 
interests of the child, with parental interests—whether biological or 
adoptive—taking over: 
The law’s commitment to respect parental rights does not 
mean that children are to be regarded as property. 
However, sometimes they are treated as such. This 
misperception is reinforced by language that emphasizes 
the rights rather than duties of adults. The filing of a birth 
certificate is thought of as an assignment of a child to 
adults rather than the other way around. Likewise, divorce 
decrees award custody of the child to one of the competing 
adults rather than awarding a custodial parent to the child. 
The vocabulary of placement ought to be reconceptualized 
to force focus where it belongs—on parental responsibility 
to satisfy a child’s fundamental right to caring parents. 
The child’s best interests will be served by providing the 
least detrimental alternative.45 
This should not be read to strip biological parents or adoptive parents of 
their rights and interests. Rather, interests of the parents are subordinate in 
                                                
 43. Elizabeth J. Samuels, Time to Decide? The Laws Governing Mothers’ Consents to 
the Adoption of Their Newborn Infants, 72 TENN. L. REV. 509, 511 (2005). 
 44. See JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ALBERT J. SOLNIT, SONJA GOLDSTEIN & ANNA FREUD, THE 
BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: THE LEAST DETRIMENTAL ALTERNATIVE 9 (The Free Press 
1996). 
 45. Id. at 227–28. 
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the adoption context to those of the child, except when—as would happen 
without deviation in a perfect world—those interests run in concert.46 
As the argument has been framed here—with a view of the conflict 
as between keeping the biological family together for the sake of stability 
for the child and, in cases where the biological family has been disrupted, 
keeping the adoptive family together for the sake of stability for the child—
the crux of the conflict becomes the window of time when final decisions 
for the child’s fate are being determined.47 Where the child’s interests are 
the ultimate aim, resolution of this conflict can only be attained by 
determining an elusive “if”: If the biological family is to remain together, 
then it is in the child’s best interests for birthparents to be allowed generous 
periods of time to consider consent to adoption as well as to revoke that 
consent.48 But if the child is to ultimately be adopted, then it is in the child’s 
best interests for the process to take place smoothly and quickly and 
without threat of later disruption.49 Birthparents’ and adoptive parents’ 
interests each run parallel to both conflicting interests of the child, to a 
degree, and “in a better society” would run entirely in congruity.50 But in 
the real world in which we live, the various actors have divergent interests 
in the time surrounding the birth and possible adoption of the child,51 and 
often the child’s interests are in conflict with one another.52 At this point in 
the analysis, a closer look at the interests of the various actors in the 
adoption triad is warranted. 
A. Birthparents’ Interests 
Despite the stigma often attached to women who “give up their 
babies” for adoption, the vast majority of birthmothers who seek an 
adoption plan have made an immensely unselfish choice.53 Adoption is a 
loving alternative to abortion, a carefully and deliberately considered 
                                                
 46. See id. at 228 (“Were we living in a better society, there would be no need for this 
volume. But there is a need to try to contribute, even in a small way, to making our world a 
little less unperfect for our children.”). 
 47. See generally id. at 41–45. 
 48. Naomi R. Cahn, Family Issue(s), in FAMILIES BY LAW: AN ADOPTION READER 270, 
supra note 12, at 271 [hereinafter Cahn, Family Issue(s)]. 
 49. Id. 
 50. See GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 44, at 228. Birthparents should desire finality in 
adoption proceedings for the child. Likewise, adoptive parents should desire that 
birthparents are afforded as much opportunity to make an informed decision as possible. 
And both parties should hope for the ultimate outcome that will serve the child best. 
 51. Cahn, Family Issue(s), supra note 48, at 271 (“An emphasis on the rights of the 
biological mother suggests a longer time period for reconsideration of adoption, while a 
recognition of the rights of adoptive parents suggests that a shorter time period may be 
appropriate.”). 
 52. See infra notes 94–97 and accompanying text. 
 53. National Council for Adoption, The Rights of Adopted Children Should Be 
Protected, reprinted in ADOPTION: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS 82, 83 (Mary E. Williams ed. 
2006). 
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option, and a decision not lightly entered into.54 “Society should honor and 
respect birthparents, and especially birthmothers, for these loving, unselfish 
decisions.”55 
But blood ties are extremely hard to break, and birthparents should 
be afforded every consideration when making such a lasting decision: 
“[T]he earliest and most hallowed of the ties that bind humanity, in all 
countries considered sacred, is the relationship of parent and child. 
Therefore, parents have the first and natural right to their children.”56 And 
the United States Supreme Court has long recognized the fundamental right 
of a parent to order the welfare and upbringing of his or her offspring.57 
Consent and revocation limits have been set in deference to this primary 
relationship. But do they go far enough? Some commentators think not. 
One recent study concluded that a later date before which a 
birthmother is allowed to consent coupled with a prolonged revocation 
period would better suit the birthmother’s interests.58 While this study 
found that “there is no magic formula that perfectly balances the need for 
deliberate and final decisions with the need to establish children in 
permanent homes,” a timeframe consisting of four to seven days mandatory 
waiting period before signing consent along with a minimum three week 
revocation period would satisfy these conflicting goals adequately.59 The 
finding was based in large part on a comparison between American models, 
which, though disparate, trend toward shorter consent and revocation 
periods, and European and Australian models, which trend toward longer 
periods, averaging six to eight weeks.60 In particular, Professor Samuels 
uses as an example a case where a younger birthmother gave valid consent 
in Kansas, which allows consent a short time after birth (twelve hours) with 
no possibility of revocation.61 Though there were suspicious circumstances 
surrounding the adoption, Kansas courts ultimately found no evidence of 
fraud or duress and dismissed the birthmother’s petition to set aside her 
consent.62 The article goes on to compare the outcome of this Kansas case 
with its hypothetical outcome in Victoria, Australia.63 Though the girl 
would have been allowed to revoke her consent under the more liberal 
standards in Australia, it appears unclear how any of this, ipso facto, means 
                                                
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. In re Adoption of Voss, 550 P.2d 481, 485 (Wyo. 1976) (citing In re Adoption of 
Bryant, 189 N.E.2d 593 (Ind. App. 1963)). 
 57. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (“It is cardinal with us that 
the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function 
and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.”). 
 58. See Samuels, supra note 43, at 571. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 516 (discussing In re Baby Girl W., No. 87,291, slip op. (Kan. Ct. App. Apr. 
5, 2002)). 
 62. Id. at 515. 
 63. Id. at 516–18. 
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that Kansas inadequately protected her rights.64 Indeed, much of Professor 
Samuels’ article, among other writings on protection of birthparents’ rights 
with regard to consent and revocation,65 seems to provide stronger 
commentary on best practices by social workers and adoption attorneys, 
and less help with regard to reasons why longer revocation periods actually 
serve birthparents’ needs.66 What these commentators also fail to address is 
that statutory waiting periods before consent can be given are statutory 
minimums; there is no requirement that a birthmother must relinquish her 
parental rights at that time or at any other time. As is clearly addressed in 
the model statute proposed in Part V of this Note, in most states’ laws, in 
adoption counseling, and on the face of most consent forms, the 
birthmother may take as much time as she wishes to make an adoption plan, 
consider other alternatives, or take her baby home to parent.67 
Often neglected in the discussion of birthparents’ interests is the 
biological father of the child.68 Though rationales for different treatment of 
birthfathers include one-night stands, abandonment of the pregnant mother, 
and the presumed lesser emotional toll taken on the father in childbirth, 
these situations do not always pan out in reality, nor do they necessarily 
warrant lesser consideration for the birthfather.69 Nonetheless, distinctions 
are often made between birthfathers and birthmothers in statutory consent 
requirements.70 Sadly, all that is often required of the birthfather is his 
signature.71 
But frequently the birthfather cannot be found. Adoption agencies 
and attorneys generally do all that they can to locate a missing birthfather, 
as most courts require his signature or a showing that his consent cannot be 
                                                
 64. See generally id. (describing the facts of and analyzing In re Baby Girl W., No. 
87,291, slip op). 
 65. See, e.g., Origins Canada, The Rights of Birth Mothers Should Be Protected, in 
ADOPTION: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS 59, 60 (Mary E. Williams ed. 2006) (“The adoption 
‘counselors’ like to say ‘It’s your choice’, [sic] all the while making it seem as if you have 
no other real options. They have lots of training in ‘counseling’ expectant mothers and 
grandparents-to-be so they can get more babies for customers. Do mothers (and fathers) 
really ‘choose’ adoption?”); see also Heather Lowe, The Rights of Birth Mothers Must Be 
Protected, in ADOPTION: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS 45, 46–47, 51 (Roman Espejo ed. 2002) 
(“But adoption as it is practiced today is a disgrace. It’s become an industry geared not 
toward ‘the best interests of the child’ (itself a worn out catchphrase with little real meaning) 
but toward serving people who think they have a God-given right to add a child to their 
home.”). Ms. Lowe suggests as one of her reform points that irrevocable consent be 
abolished. She posits that a three-month window for decision would be preferable to a 
seventy-two-hour window, based primarily on the emotionally charged and overwhelming 
atmosphere that a birthmother finds herself in during that initial time after birth. 
 66. See generally Samuels, supra note 43. 
 67. See infra APPENDIX B: Proposed Statute §§ 4(e), 6(c). 
 68. See Jeanne Warren Lindsay, The Rights of Birth Fathers Must Be Protected, in 
ADOPTION: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS 55, 56 (Roman Espejo ed. 2002). 
 69. Id. 
 70. See infra APPENDIX A. 
 71. Lindsay, supra note 68, at 56. 
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obtained.72 Putative father registries have been established in twenty-seven 
states, with seven more states providing methods of registration through 
existing agencies, such as the state health department or department of 
children’s services.73 The putative father registry affords a man who 
believes he may be the father of a child an opportunity to register his belief 
and assert his claim to parenthood.74 It also provides an avenue for the 
birthfather to be notified of the initiation and progress of adoption 
proceedings.75 Failure to register his claim, lack of involvement with the 
mother during pregnancy, and lack of financial or emotional support for the 
mother are generally viewed in the same light as abandonment, and may 
preclude a birthfather from later asserting a claim.76 Likewise, failure to 
notify a registered putative father of a pending adoption will likely be fatal 
to the adoption proceeding.77 
B. Adoptive Parents’ Interests 
What types of people seek to adopt?78 The answer, of course, varies 
greatly from situation to situation. Adoptive parents may be a childless 
couple suffering from infertility or a single mother or father wanting to 
share her or his home, or perhaps a couple with children, with room and 
love to spare. Some adopt for humanitarian reasons or because the situation 
of a particular orphan comes to their attention. Whatever the reason for 
seeking to adopt, there is no question that the demand from adoptive 
parents remains high; there is no shortage of people willing to adopt 
infants.79 
But adoptive families often have many obstacles to overcome. 
First, the law favors familial connections stemming from birth, creating 
                                                
 72. Id. at 60–61; see also APPENDIX B §§ 3(a), (b) (requiring “good faith and diligent 
effort” and “an affidavit of diligent search”). 
 73. See APPENDIX A for a listing of which states have established putative father 
registries, which states have adopted other methods of registering possible fathers, and 
statutes responsible for their creation. 
 74. J.S.A. v. M.H., 863 N.E.2d 236, 247 (Ill. 2007). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983); see also id. at 262 n.18 (“[A] natural 
father who has played a substantial role in rearing his child has a greater claim to 
constitutional protection than a mere biological parent.”). 
 77. CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN 
SERV., THE RIGHTS OF UNMARRIED FATHERS 3–4 (2010), available at https://www.child 
welfare.gov/systemwide/laws_policies/statutes/putative.pdf. 
 78. Just as the stereotypical crack-addict fifteen-year-old birthmother and married-
and-doesn’t-want-his-wife-to-find out birthfather are largely after-school special promoted 
mythologies, the baby-hungry, I-have-more-money-than-I-know-what-to-do-with adoptive 
parents only exist in Hollywood (perhaps literally), contrary to Ms. Lowe’s assertion, see 
supra note 65. 
 79. See CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN 
SERV., HOW MANY CHILDREN WERE ADOPTED IN 2007 AND 2008? (2011), available at 
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/adopted0708.pdf. 
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what one author calls a “powerful blood bias” in favor of biological 
families, even in cases of older children who live under abuse or neglect at 
the hand of a biological parent.80 Second, the law makes privacy of 
birthparents a major concern, giving them control over “openness” or 
“closedness” of the adoption,81 while adoptive parents are expected to forgo 
any privacy in the process: “By contrast to the protections accorded 
biogenetic parents, individuals who wish to parent through adoption find 
their personal values and most intimate behaviors subject to intense scrutiny 
and bureaucratic regulation.”82 Third, uncertainty in the permanence of the 
adoption decree and the specter of a returning birthparent seeking reunion 
with the child, threatening the family bond that had been formed, drives 
adoptive parents to seek a “final, not a temporary expedient.”83 
Changes in the laws governing adoption have trended toward 
eliminating some of the uncertainty in the initiation of adoption 
proceedings, but particularly in states whose laws still allow liberal time 
periods for revocation of birthparent consent, much uncertainty still remains 
for adoptive parents.84 Some adoptive parents—and sometimes 
birthparents—seek the aid of “interim care” families to fill the gap between 
consent and possibility of revocation.85 An adoption agency or adoption 
attorney will arrange a fostering situation for whatever time period a 
birthmother feels that she needs to make a decision to give consent, or in 
the case of initiation of interim care initiated by adoptive parents, to avoid 
the heartache of having a child in the adoptive family’s home for a period 
of time after receiving consent, only to have the child taken away on 
revocation.86 And adoptive parents who do take the child into their home 
                                                
 80. Elizabeth Bartholet, Taking Adoption Seriously: Radical Revolution or Modest 
Revisionism?, in FAMILIES BY LAW: AN ADOPTION READER 115, supra note 12, at 117. 
 81. Joan Heifetz Hollinger, Overview of Legal Status of Post-Adoption Contact 
Agreements, in FAMILIES BY LAW: AN ADOPTION READER 159, supra note 12, at 159. 
 82. Naomi R. Cahn & Joan Heifetz Hollinger, Introduction to FAMILIES BY LAW: AN 
ADOPTION READER, supra note 12, at 4. 
 83. Cahn, Perfect Substitutes, supra note 19, at 24. 
 84. Susan Yates Ely, Natural Parents’ Right to Withdraw Consent to Adoption: How 
Far Should the Right Extend?, 31 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 685, 685 (1993) (“[E]ven though 
various state statutes and cases in this area reflect an improvement in the consideration of the 
child’s well-being, many laws governing revocation of consent are still too uncertain and 
weak. If public policy in the United States is to promote the adoption of unwanted children, 
weaknesses in the law concerning natural parents’ revocation of consent can only discourage 
qualified prospective parents from adopting.”). 
 85. See, e.g., Interim Care for Infants, BARKER FOUNDATION, www.barkerfoundation. 
org/pregnancy-services/interim-infant-care (last visited January 12, 2014); Interim Child 
Care, SPENCE-CHAPIN, www.spence-chapin.org/unplanned-pregnancy/a4_interim_child_ 
care.php (last visited January 12, 2014) (“After your child is born, you may need some 
additional time to make a permanent plan.”). 
 86. Before the reader judges too harshly, realize that the best interests of the child are 
most readily served by permanency. A better solution than interim care would be for the 
birthmother to take the child home with her for the days or weeks that constitute the 
revocation period. If she is truly using that time to “make sure of her decision,” time with the 
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during this uncertain period often are reluctant to fully commit too soon, 
doing damage to the bonding process between parent and child.87 
The law with regard to the initiation of adoption proceedings has 
historically viewed adoptive parents—third parties to the parent-child 
relation, in the eyes of some—as “strangers without rights.”88 Birthparents 
control the process in its initiation: First contact with an adoption 
professional, social worker, attorney, or direct contact with a prospective 
adoptive family is voluntary, not coerced by any government or private 
entity, and susceptible to the birthparent’s decision to walk away at any 
time prior to signing consent. But adoptive parents must be accorded some 
degree of certainty in the process once an adoption plan has been initiated. 
“Otherwise, in every case the adoption process would be subject to 
interruption at the whim of the natural parent.”89 Though the Supreme 
Court of the United States has recognized that adoptive relationships are the 
legal equivalent of biological parent-child relationships, such legal 
significance does not attach until an adoption is finalized.90 During the time 
between birthparent consent and finalization of the adoption decree,91 the 
child is without a legal parent.92 In some jurisdictions, revocation is 
possible until the decree is final; in a handful, even after.93 
C. The Interests of the Child 
Is it not the burden of every actor in an adoption—birthparents, 
adoptive parents, the court, society at large—to protect the rights, interests, 
and well-being of the weakest and most vulnerable person involved in the 
process? Consider the keen insight shown by the dissent in the “Baby 
Jessica” case concerning protection of the child in the adoption context: 
The superior claim of the child to be heard in this case is 
grounded not just in law, but in basic human morality. 
Adults . . . make choices in their lives, and society holds 
them responsible for their choices. When adults are forced 
                                                                                                             
child would certainly serve those ends more readily. But in most cases, the adoptive family 
has custody of the child during that uncertain time. The emotional strain can be unbearable, 
and child psychiatrists have long held that a child in infancy feels that strain and is not best 
served by either prolonging the strain or by being moved to the care of a temporary 
caregiver. See GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 44, at 41–43. 
 87. Id. at 13–14. 
 88. Petition of Doe, 638 N.E.2d 181, 190 (Ill. 1994); see also id. at 188. 
 89. Ely, supra note 84, at 697 (quoting In re Appeal in Yuma County, 682 P.2d 6 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1984)). 
 90. Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 844 n.51 
(1977). 
 91. In most jurisdictions, a minimum of six months from the filing of the adoption 
petition by the adoptive parents. 
 92. See GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 44, at 102–03. 
 93. See APPENDIX A; see also discussion infra Part IV(A). 
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to bear the consequences of their choices, however 
disastrous, at least their character and personality have 
been fully formed, and that character can provide the 
foundation for recovery, the will to go on. 
The character and personality of a child two and one-half 
years old is just beginning to take shape. To visit the 
consequences of adult choices upon the child during the 
formative years of her life, and to force her to sort out the 
competing emotional needs of the [birthparents and 
adoptive parents], is unnecessarily harsh and without legal 
justification.94 
Justice Levin points to the heart of the matter: All of the adults involved in 
the adoption process have made choices that have led them to this point. 
Their needs, while not inconsequential, should be subservient to those of 
the child. The child did not choose her circumstances. She did not choose 
her birthparents. She did not choose to be adopted, did not bring an 
adoption agency or social worker or attorney into her birthmother’s life. 
She did not choose her adoptive parents. She has no window in which to 
give consent, or revoke consent, or to follow through with an adoption 
decree or not. She had no paper work to fill out, no homestudy to conduct. 
The child is ultimately at the mercy of the whims of those to whom she 
must entrust her safety and well-being. Does it really matter to the child in 
her infancy who cares for her and how care is executed? Commentators and 
psychoanalysts disagree: Perhaps a child is better left in a foster care 
situation during the first few months of her life while her fate is decided,95 
or perhaps these first formative months are crucial in her development and 
require the nurture, care, and bonding that only a permanent parent 
relationship can provide.96 
Court systems in the United States have developed what is 
commonly called “the best interests of the child” standard to govern child 
custody disputes.97 Much controversy and much confusion about the 
application of this standard has commentators wondering if it is not just “a 
euphemism for unfettered judicial discretion.”98 The 1851 Massachusetts 
adoption statute99 makes no mention of such a standard, rather 
concentrating on eligibility for adoption and the legal effects of the 
                                                
 94. In re Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649, 670–71 (Mich. 1993) (Levin, J., dissenting). 
 95. Samuels, supra note 43, at 571. 
 96. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 44, at 19–20. 
 97. See generally 2 AM. JUR. 2D Adoption § 131 (2014) (presenting the best interests 
standard and the wide range of treatment it endures in the courts). 
 98. DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS ET AL., CONTEMPORARY FAMILY LAW 675 (West 3rd ed. 
2012). 
 99. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
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adoptive relationship.100 However, a similar statute passed in Pennsylvania 
in 1855 voiced a concern for “the welfare of the child” in adoption 
consideration.101 Through its development, particularly in the last half of 
the twentieth century, the best interests of the child standard has taken 
many twists and turns in meaning and application, standing for a 
determination of stability and permanency for the child in one instance, and 
a weighing of which parent or parents would be “better” for the child, in the 
judge’s opinion, in other cases.102 Professor Welt demonstrates: 
The phrase, “best interests of the child,” means one thing to 
a juvenile judge, another thing to adoptive parents, 
something else to natural parents and still something 
different to disinterested observers. The tendency is to 
apply intuition in deciding that a child would be “better” 
with one set of parents than with another, and then to 
express this intuitive feeling in terms of the legal standard 
of being “in the best interests of the child.”103 
Many courts recognize this tendency to substitute the judge’s preferences 
for an objective determination of the child’s well-being, and accordingly 
rule in favor of a balance between choices made by the various actors and 
the appropriateness of the particular outcome.104 
Illustrative of the great confusion surrounding this standard is the 
classic decision of Painter v. Bannister.105 Painter involved a custody battle 
over a seven-year-old boy between his biological father and maternal 
grandparents, who had cared for the boy since his mother’s death two years 
earlier.106 The contrast between lifestyle could not have been greater.107 The 
grandparents were a picture of mid-western stability, providing a nice home 
with prospects for education and betterment for their grandson.108 By 
contrast, the court described the child’s father as “bohemian,” “agnostic or 
atheist,” and “a political liberal.”109 The court began its analysis with the 
following assertion: “It is not our prerogative to determine custody upon 
our choice of one of two ways of life within normal and proper limits and 
we will not do so.”110 But the court acknowledged that a pure choice based 
                                                
 100. Cahn, Perfect Substitutes, supra note 19, at 22–23. 
 101. Id. at 23. 
 102. Philip S. Welt, Adoption and the Constitution: Are Adoptive Parents Really 
“Strangers Without Rights”?, 1995 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 165, 221 (1995). 
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on the court’s preferences would deliver custody to the grandparents, that 
the presumption for parental preference had been weakened, and that 
security and stability were the ultimate measures by which the decision 
should be made.111 Thus, the court overcame blood preference for the 
biological father of this child, ruling in favor of custody for the 
grandparents, based largely on the relationship developed between the child 
and his grandparents, and regardless of an absence of a finding of unfitness 
in the father.112 
It is not the aim of this Note to determine whether this case was 
rightly decided, or even whether the “best interests” standard was rightly 
applied. Rather, this case provides a ready illustration of the myriad ways 
the standard may be interpreted. Anna Freud, psychoanalyst and co-author 
of the celebrated Beyond the Best Interests of the Child,113 commented on 
Painter that without actually interviewing the Painters and the Bannisters, 
she could not make a determination of whether she would agree with the 
court’s ruling or not.114 However, blood relationship would get little 
consideration from her, as apparently it did from the trial judge: 
The “blood-ties” between parent and child as well as the 
alleged paternal and maternal “instincts” are biological 
concepts which, only too often, prove vague and unreliable 
when transferred to the field of psychology. 
Psychologically speaking, the child’s “father” is the adult 
man to whom the child attaches a particular, 
psychologically distinctive set of feelings. When this type 
of emotional tie is disrupted, the child’s feelings suffer. 
When such separations occur during phases of 
development in which the child is particularly vulnerable, 
the whole foundation of his personality may be shaken. The 
presence of or the reunion with a biological father to whom 
no such ties exist will not recompense the child for the loss 
which he has suffered. Conversely, the biological father’s 
or mother’s unselfish love for their child is by no means to 
be taken for granted. It happens often enough that 
biological parents fail in their duty to the child, while other 
adults who are less closely related to him, i.e., who have no 
                                                
 111. Id. at 156. 
 112. Id. at 158. 
 113. Many references in this Note are attributed to this work, but in its collective form, 
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 114. ANNA FREUD, Painter v. Bannister: Postscript by a Psychoanalyst, 7 WRITINGS OF 
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“instinctive” basis for their feeling, successfully take over 
the parental role.115 
It is important to note that state intervention is appropriate only in 
two circumstances: (1) where the child’s safety is endangered by the parent 
to such a degree that termination of parental rights is necessary to ensure 
safety, and (2) where, as in infant adoption, the birthparent has voluntarily 
sought to terminate her parental rights through consent to adoption.116 At 
the point the intent to terminate rights is manifested, the child is patently 
“unwanted” and without a legal parent.117 It is of utmost importance that the 
child remain in this state of flux for as short a period of time as is 
possible.118 “Adoption, if available, offers to such children the best possible 
second chance to form the permanent relationships vital to their 
development.”119 
IV. CURRENT STATUTES GOVERNING  
INFANT ADOPTION IN THE UNITED STATES 
A brief survey of adoption laws across the fifty states confirms that 
no consensus has yet been reached on how to best reconcile these policy 
concerns.120 “The lack of coherence and uniformity in our adoption laws 
and practices exposes to needless risks all parties to an adoption, and, 
especially, the children who become enmeshed in protracted litigation about 
their legal status.”121 Despite efforts of the Uniform Law Commission to 
normalize adoption statutes and the Interstate Compact on the Placement of 
Children to reconcile their application across state borders, states in their 
respective legislative acts place emphasis on different actors and their 
interests in varied, sometimes conflicting, and often confusing ways. 
Families seeking to adopt across state borders are well-advised to keep 
abreast of conflicting laws from state to state, and many feel like they must 
become experts in the laws of various states before committing to an 
adoption plan outside their home state.122 
More narrowly, attempts to navigate the quagmire of laws 
pertaining particularly to birthparent consent in infant adoptions and when 
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 116. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 44, at 101–03. 
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 120. Hollinger, State and Federal Adoption Laws, supra note 12, at 37 (“[S]tate 
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that consent can be revoked can be just as frustrating.123 Attorneys and 
adoption agencies must be well-versed in these differences if they are to 
practice in multiple jurisdictions. They must also be cognizant of the 
likelihood that their clients—both birthparents and adoptive parents—will 
be ignorant of the intricacies of consent requirements and revocation 
allowances and ready to educate and guide through the process. This is 
particularly true when adoptive parents have travelled across state lines to 
adopt. 
While the importance of understanding the detailed requirements 
for voluntary relinquishment in a particular jurisdiction cannot be stressed 
enough, it is outside the scope of this writing to examine these in any detail. 
Instead, this section will attempt to group states into general categories 
based on how liberally or narrowly their statutes treat birthparent consent 
and revocation.124 The first category treated will be those jurisdictions that 
allow broad leeway for birthparents to withdraw their consent to adoption, 
in some cases allowing revocation for any reason or no reason thirty days 
after consent is given,125 and in others leaving the possibility of revocation 
open even after entry of the final adoption decree.126 The second consists of 
those states that have somewhat followed the approach recommended in the 
Uniform Adoption Act, providing for a brief revocation period.127 The third 
category of states for purposes of this analysis provide a shorter or non-
existent revocation period upon signing and in most cases provide a 
relatively brief waiting period after birth before consent can be given.128 
Finally, we will look at the approach taken by several states that do not fit 
neatly into any of these categories but rather take a hybrid approach 
dependent on the circumstances under which consent is given. 
                                                
 123. See APPENDIX A. 
 124. We recognize that this is not the only possible way to group states for analysis. For 
example, an interesting study might be an analysis of states by putative father registry, 
discussed supra Part III, and how particular states treat birthfather rights in general. Another 
interesting study might be a comparison of judicial versus non-judicial consent, discussed 
briefly infra Part IV(D). 
 125. E.g., 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2711(c)(1) (West, WestlawNext through 2013 
Act 104); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-19-10-3 (West, WestlawNext through 2013 First Reg. Sess. 
and First Reg. Tech. Sess.). 
 126. E.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-6-21 (WestlawNext through 2013 Reg. Sess.); R.I. 
GEN. LAWS § 15-7-21.1 (Lexis Advance through 2013 Reg. Sess.). 
 127. E.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-112 (Lexis Advance through 2013 Reg. Sess.); GA. 
CODE ANN. § 19-8-9 (Lexis Advance through 2013 Reg. Sess.). 
 128. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.082 (West, WestlawNext through 2013 1st Reg. Sess.); 
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-22-109 (Lexis Advance through 2013 Reg. Sess.). 
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A. Liberal Construction of Consent and Revocation 
Twelve states allow for revocation of consent for thirty days after 
signing,129 with seven of these allowing revocation up to and, in some 
cases, beyond finalization of the adoption decree.130 While some of these 
states require a best interests determination in conjunction with revocation, 
some allow unconditional revocation.131 It is important to note that for 
purposes of this analysis invalidation of consent based on fraud, duress, 
coercion, or other manner of undue influence is not factored in. All 
jurisdictions allow for invalidation of consent for a period of time, usually 
up to the time of finalization of the adoption decree, but sometimes beyond. 
This analysis makes a distinction, as do most courts, between allowances of 
revocation of validly executed voluntary consents by birthparents and the 
invalidation of a consent induced by fraud or coercion. 
This grouping of jurisdictions allows for the least amount of change 
from the common law view of birthparent consent to adoption. Adoption 
statutes in some of these jurisdictions are construed strictly in favor of 
biological parents.132 Longer periods of time for birthparents to make up—
or to change—their minds seems to afford less opportunity for litigation.133 
But even some states that adhere to longer revocation periods have moved 
the ball away from finalization toward the thirty-day mark relative to 
signing consent. Take, for instance, Pennsylvania, whose current statute 
allows unconditional revocation up to thirty days after signing.134 
Pennsylvania courts recognized, before passage of this statute, that a 
birthmother could revoke a valid consent to adoption at any time prior to 
the final entry of the decree of adoption.135 As late as 1994, this 
construction was still in place.136 In addition, courts in Pennsylvania 
liberally construe what constitutes a valid revocation, including in some 
instances actions that can be interpreted as revocation.137 However, 
                                                
 129. These include Connecticut, Delaware, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, New 
Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and South Dakota. See infra 
APPENDIX A. 
 130. Connecticut, Iowa, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio, Rhode Island, and South 
Dakota. 
 131. See APPENDIX A. 
 132. E.g., In re B.W., 908 N.E. 2d 586, 592 (Ind. 2009). 
 133. See Samuels, supra note 43, at 548. Note that litigation is not reduced, only 
diverted. In states where revocation is limited or not available, litigation concerning 
revocation is reduced, but litigation alleging fraud increases. While states that allow for 
liberal revocation of consent seem to hear fewer cases, one reason could be that birthparents 
have less incentive to cry fraud when they do not have to. 
 134. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2711(c)(1) (West, WestlawNext through 2013 Reg. 
Sess.). 
 135. Commw. ex rel. Grimes v. Yack, 433 A.2d 1363, 1377 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981). 
 136. In re Adoption of Stickley, 638 A.2d 976, 979 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994). 
 137. Id. (Father’s refusal to cash reimbursement check for child support payments 
construed as revocation of consent). 
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Pennsylvania changed its statute in 2006 to the current thirty-day revocation 
period.138 While a birthmother is allowed by statute to revoke her consent 
for any reason, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania holds to a strict 
interpretation of the timing requirements.139 
B. States That Have Adopted a Quasi-Uniform Adoption Act Approach 
Vermont is the only state to have adopted the Uniform Adoption 
Act since it was drafted in 1994.140 And Vermont acted very quickly by 
adopting the Act in 1996.141 Interestingly, though, one area where 
Vermont’s law deviates significantly from the Uniform Act is in the timing 
of consent and revocation with regard to infant adoption.142 Though no state 
has adopted the Uniform Act’s suggested revocation period of eight days, 
seven states have adopted revocation periods ranging between seven and 
ten days.143 For instance, in Georgia, consent can be revoked for any reason 
                                                
 138. In re Adoption of J.A.S., 939 A.2d 403, 406 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007). 
 139. Id. at 408. In In re Adoption of J.A.S., the trial court had held the birthmother’s 
consent invalid ab initio because it failed to denote the marital status of the birthmother. 
However, the Superior Court held that the timeliness of the revocation, which was the first 
challenge to the original consent’s validity, must be determined before reaching the issue of 
technical validity, because the statute specified a thirty-day revocation period but did not 
“explicitly state it is subject to strict construction.” Id. The birthmother’s attempted 
revocation 100 days after signing consent was not timely, and therefore not an effective 
challenge to the consent’s validity. Id. at 409. Presumably, had the birthmother delivered her 
petition within the thirty-day window, she would not have had to argue invalidity at all. 
 140. UNIF. ADOPTION ACT, 9 U.L.A. 11 (Supp. 2013). 
 141. Id.; 1996 Vt. Acts & Resolves 262. 
 142. Compare VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 2-404(a) with UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 2-404, 9 
U.L.A. 53. 
 
Time and Prerequisites for Execution of Consent or Relinquishment. 
(a) A parent whose consent to the adoption of a minor is required by 
section 2-401 of this title may not execute a consent or a relinquishment 
sooner than 36 hours after the minor is born. A parent who executes a 
consent or relinquishment may revoke the consent or relinquishment 
within 21 days after the consent or relinquishment is executed by filing a 
written notice in the court in which the consent was executed. 
 
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 2-404 (West, WestlawNext through 2013 Sess.). 
 
Time and Prerequisites for Execution of Consent or Relinquishment. 
(a) A parent whose consent to the adoption of a minor is required by 
Section 2-401 may execute a consent or a relinquishment only after the 
minor is born. A parent who executes a consent or relinquishment may 
revoke the consent or relinquishment within 192 hours after the birth of 
the minor. 
 
UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 2-404. 
 143. These include Alaska, Arkansas, Georgia, Minnesota, North Carolina, Tennessee, 
and Virginia. See infra APPENDIX A. 
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at all within ten days of execution.144 Georgia courts will not allow 
revocation after the ten-day period has expired, and have expressly denied 
requests to extend the period for “good and sufficient cause.”145 
But courts will consider a petition to set aside a surrender as invalid 
even after the revocation period has run, on grounds of fraud or duress in 
inducing the birthparent to sign consent.146 Duress, for purposes of 
invalidating a consent to adoption, is defined as it is in all contract cases.147 
For instance, in one recent Georgia case, the Court of Appeals found that a 
state children’s services caseworker’s “suggestion” that it would be in the 
mother’s best interest to surrender her parental rights was sufficient grounds 
to set aside the mother’s consent, even though the statutory ten-day 
revocation period had elapsed.148 But financial or emotional pressure, 
unless caused by an adverse party, particularly the other person seeking to 
enter the contract or someone acting on their behalf, does not constitute 
duress.149 Nor does a self-inflicted crisis, no matter how extreme or to what 
extent internal influences may have affected the birthmother’s judgment.150 
C. Narrow Construction of Consent and Revocation 
An increasing trend has been seen over the past decade of states 
reducing the statutory timeframe for both consent and revocation.151 While 
there is no clear majority rule, the largest plurality of states—eighteen at the 
time of this writing—falls into this category.152 These consist of states that 
have shorter mandatory waiting periods of twelve to ninety-six hours for 
                                                
 144. Hicks v. Stargel, 487 S.E.2d 428, 429 (Ct. App. Ga. 1997). 
 145. Id. 
 146. This is true in all fifty states, though the time frame varies for how long a 
birthparent has to bring a challenge on these grounds. 
 147. Mabou v. Eller, 502 S.E.2d 760, 762 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998) (“Duress is considered 
as a species of fraud in which compulsion in some form takes the place of deception in 
accomplishing an injury. . . . Duress which will avoid a contract must consist of threats of 
bodily or other harm, or other means amounting to coercion, or tending to coerce the will of 
another, and actually inducing him to do an act contrary to his free will.”) (quoting Tidwell 
v. Critz, 282 S.E.2d 104, 107 (Ga. 1981) (citations omitted)). 
 148. In re K.W., 662 S.E.2d 255, 257 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008). 
 149. Mabou, 502 S.E.2d at 762. 
 150. Schumacher v. Sexton, 455 S.E.2d 348, 349 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) overruled by In 
Interest of B.G.D., 479 S.E.2d 439 (Ct. App. Ga. 1996). The court in B.G.D. overruled 
Schumacher on grounds of “good and sufficient cause.” Despite the fact that the mother in 
Schumacher was addicted to cocaine and claimed to be under the influence when signing 
consent papers, the trial court found, and the appellate court affirmed, that “she knowingly 
and voluntarily relinquished” her parental rights. Schumacher, 466 S.E.2d at 350. 
 151. Samuels, supra note 43, at 545. 
 152. Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Kansas, Maine, Louisiana, Massachusetts, 
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, South Carolina, Utah, 
Washington, and Wyoming. 
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consent153 and do not allow any revocation after consent is given.154 And 
irrevocable means irrevocable. Though consent may be invalidated in these 
states by a showing of inducement by fraud or duress,155 consent will be 
upheld in cases bordering on such a finding. Mistake is not a sufficient 
ground once the revocation period has passed,156 nor is a birthparent’s 
status as a minor.157 Even potentially misleading statements by a social 
worker may be cured by the social worker reading and explaining the 
consent form to the birthparent.158 One method employed by many 
jurisdictions for assuring the voluntariness of consent is the requirement of 
pre-consent interviews with birthparents by an adoption professional; a 
failure to conduct such an interview is prima facie evidence of 
inducement.159 
D. Other Approaches 
The remaining thirteen states are either some type of hybrid 
between the categories above, take no stance on waiting times for consent 
or revocation periods (or both), simply do not neatly fit into one of these 
categories, or are so ambiguous or equivocal that the scope of this Note 
does not allow us to delve into their respective statutes. However, two other 
distinct categories arise that are worth mentioning, if only in passing, that 
distinguish based on where consent is given or by whom consent is taken. 
The first of these consists of two states that distinguish between 
consents given in the courtroom and those given outside the courtroom. 
New York law does not specify a waiting period after which consent can be 
given.160 But judicial consent, executed in a courtroom in front of a judge, 
is irrevocable upon execution, while non-judicial consent can be revoked 
within forty-five days.161 In Oklahoma, consent can be given any time after 
                                                
 153. With the exception of Louisiana, which makes a distinction between agency 
adoptions and private adoptions, requiring a five-day waiting period for private adoptions. 
See infra APPENDIX A. 
 154. With the exceptions of Missouri and Washington, which require approval of 
consent by a court. Consent is technically not valid until court approval is given. Approval is 
expedited, however, with Missouri requiring approval within three days of signing or the 
consent becomes irrevocable, and Washington requiring a forty-eight hour lapse between 
birth and approval or signing and approval. See infra APPENDIX A. 
 155. F.R. v. Adoption of Baby Boy Born November 2, 2010, No. 1D12-16, 2012 WL 
1813520 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. May 21, 2012) (finding that adoption agency’s failure to 
translate documents into a language the birthmother could understand invalidated consent). 
 156. J.K. ex rel. D.K. v. M.K., 5 P.3d 782, 791 (Wyo. 2000) (finding that birthfather’s 
belief that his consent was not final was unavailing). 
 157. Id. at 792. 
 158. Id. 
 159. J.S. v. S.A., 912 So. 2d 650, 658 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005). 
 160. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111 (WestlawNext through 2013 Ch. 340). 
 161. Id. 
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the child is born.162 Judicial consent is likewise irrevocable, and non-
judicial consent can be revoked within fifteen days.163 
The other category consists of two states that distinguish between 
agency and non-agency adoptions in their consent and revocation laws. 
California allows consent to be given any time after birth in the case of an 
agency adoption,164 with consent revocable only by mutual consent.165 But 
in the case of direct placement, California allows consent when the 
birthmother is discharged from the hospital,166 with a thirty-day revocation 
period.167 Texas makes a similar distinction. Birthmother consent in Texas 
may be given forty-eight hours after the birth of the child.168 Consent given 
to a state-licensed agency is irrevocable upon execution.169 All other 
consents are revocable for eleven days, unless the consent expressly 
provides otherwise, but such a contractual revocation period may not 
exceed sixty days.170 
V. PROPOSAL: WHICH STATUTORY SCHEME IS  
“LEAST DETRIMENTAL” TO THE CHILD’S INTERESTS? 
The adoption statute proposed in APPENDIX B fits squarely within 
the narrow construction category described in Part IV(C) of this Note. The 
statute provides procedural and notice safeguards for birthparents.171 It also 
mandates pre-consent counseling for the protection of the birthparents172 in 
addition to a recitation of birthparents’ rights and an explanation of the 
finality of relinquishment on the face of the consent form to be signed.173 In 
support of finality of the adoption placement, an interest shared by all three 
members of the adoption triad, the minimum required delay in allowance of 
consent by the birthmother has been kept brief, allowing for relinquishment 
when seventy-two hours have elapsed after the birth of the child, or upon 
the release of the birthmother from the hospital, whichever is earlier.174 The 
statute also makes such consent by the birthmother, as well as consent by 
                                                
 162. OKLA. ANN. STAT. tit. 10, § 7503-2.2 (WestlawNext through 54th Legis. Sess. Ch. 
23). 
 163. Id. 
 164. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8700 (West, WestlawNext through 2013 Reg. Sess.). 
 165. Id. (stating that in an agency adoption, consent can only be revoked by mutual 
consent of both the birthparent and adoptive parent, but if the adoptive parent to whom 
consent was originally given fails to finalize the adoption, consent is then revocable for 
thirty days). 
 166. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8801.3 (West, WestlawNext through 2013 Reg. Sess.). 
 167. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8814.5 (West, WestlawNext through 2013 Reg. Sess.). 
 168. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.103 (West, WestlawNext through 2013 Reg. Sess.). 
 169. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.106 (WestlawNext). 
 170. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.103 (WestlawNext). 
 171. See infra APPENDIX B §§ 1(c), 3(a)–(b), 4, 5. 
 172. Id.§ 6. 
 173. Id. § 4. 
 174. Id. § 4(b). 
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the birthfather, irrevocable upon signing.175 This proposal is consistent with 
a trend seen in recent years toward expeditious pursuit of finality in the 
initiation of adoption proceedings,176 is supported by the arguments set 
forth in this Note, and is desirable as a model for uniformity as states seek 
coherence in adoption regulation. 
This Part will set forth the proposed statute section by section, with 
each section followed by brief commentary.177 Finally, argument in support 
of key aspects of the statute, particularly with regard to policy concerns in 
support of shorter waiting periods for consent and the abolishment of 
revocation periods, will follow. 
A. Proposed Statute 
Section 1. 
(1) Consent. 
 
(a) Consent to an adoption or an affidavit of 
nonpaternity shall be executed as follows: 
1. If by an agency, by affidavit from its 
authorized representative. 
2. If by any other person, in the presence 
of the court or by affidavit 
acknowledged before a notary public 
and in the presence of two witnesses. 
3. If by a court, by an appropriate order or 
certificate of the court. 
 
(b) A minor parent has the power to consent to the 
adoption of his or her child and has the power 
to relinquish his or her control or custody of 
the child to an adoption entity. Such consent or 
relinquishment is valid and has the same force 
and effect as a consent or relinquishment 
executed by an adult parent. A minor parent, 
having executed a consent or relinquishment, 
may not revoke that consent upon reaching the 
age of majority or otherwise becoming 
emancipated. 
 
(c) A consent or an affidavit of nonpaternity 
executed by a minor parent who is 14 years of 
                                                
 175. Id. §§ 4(a), (b), (e). 
 176. Samuels, supra note 43, at 545. 
 177. The text of the entire proposed statute is included in APPENDIX B, infra, for the 
reader’s convenience. 
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age or younger must be witnessed by a parent, 
legal guardian, or court-appointed guardian ad 
litem. 
 
(d) The notice and consent provisions of this 
chapter as they relate to the father of a child do 
not apply in cases in which the child is 
conceived as a result of a violation of the 
criminal laws of this or another state or 
country, including, but not limited to, sexual 
battery, unlawful sexual activity with certain 
minors, lewd acts perpetrated upon a minor, or 
incest. 
 
COMMENTS 
Section (1)(a) provides who may assist a birthparent in executing 
consent and in what form consent must come, always in writing, under each 
possible circumstance.178 For the purpose of consent to adoption, a minor 
birthparent is treated the same as an adult, and his or her consent cannot be 
revoked based on age, nor will it become revocable upon the birthparent 
reaching majority.179 However, if the birthparent is fourteen years of age or 
less, a parent, legal guardian, or court-appointed guardian ad litem must 
witness the execution of consent.180 Section (1)(d) provides that a 
birthfather who conceives a child as the result of a sex crime does not enjoy 
the same rights to notice and consent.181 
 
Section 2. 
(2) A consent that does not name or otherwise identify the 
adopting parent is valid if the consent contains a 
statement by the person consenting that the consent was 
voluntarily executed and that identification of the 
adopting parent is not required for granting the consent. 
 
COMMENTS 
Section (2) provides that it is not necessary to name the adoptive 
parent or parents on the written consent, but the birthparent must 
acknowledge in writing that the consent was voluntary and that the adoptive 
parent was purposely not identified.182 
 
                                                
 178. See infra APPENDIX B § 1(a). 
 179. Id. § 1(b). 
 180. Id. § 1(c). 
 181. Id. § 1(d). 
 182. See infra APPENDIX B § 2. 
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Section 3. 
(3) Availability of Persons Required to Give Consent. 
 
(a) A good faith and diligent effort must be made to 
have each parent whose identity is known and 
whose consent is required interviewed by a 
representative of the adoption entity before the 
consent is executed. A summary of each 
interview, or a statement that the parent is 
unidentified, unlocated, or unwilling or 
unavailable to be interviewed, must be filed 
with the petition to terminate parental rights 
pending adoption. The interview may be 
excused by the court for good cause. 
 
(b) If any person who is required to consent is 
unavailable because the person cannot be 
located, an affidavit of diligent search shall be 
filed. 
 
(c) If any person who is required to consent is 
unavailable because the person is deceased, the 
petition to terminate parental rights pending 
adoption must be accompanied by a certified 
copy of the death certificate. 
 
COMMENTS 
Every effort must be made to identify and get the consent of both 
birthparents.183 Pre-consent interviews184 are required by statute, and the 
adoption professional is required to write a summary of the interview or a 
statement of why a birthparent was unavailable to be interviewed.185 Under 
the proposed statute, if a birthparent cannot be located, the adoption 
professional must file “an affidavit of diligent search” or, in the case of 
death of a birthparent, a certified copy of the death certificate.186 
 
Section 4. 
(4) Execution Procedure, Timing, and Irrevocability. 
 
(a) An affidavit of nonpaternity may be executed 
before the birth of the child; however, the 
                                                
 183. Id. § 3(a). 
 184. See infra notes 202–205 and accompanying text (discussing Pre-Consent 
Counseling). 
 185. Infra APPENDIX B § 3(a). 
 186. Id. §§ 3(b), (c). 
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consent to an adoption may not be executed 
before the birth of the child except in a 
preplanned adoption. An affidavit of 
nonpaternity may be set aside only if the court 
finds that the affidavit was obtained by fraud or 
duress. 
 
(b) A consent to the adoption of a child who is to be 
placed for adoption may be executed by the 
birthmother 72 hours after the child’s birth or 
the day the birthmother is notified in writing, 
either on her patient chart or in release 
paperwork, that she is fit to be released from 
the licensed hospital or birth center, whichever 
is earlier. A consent by the birthfather may be 
executed at any time. The consent is valid upon 
execution and may be withdrawn only if the 
court finds that it was obtained by fraud or 
duress. 
 
(c) If the consent of one parent is set aside in 
accordance with this chapter, any other 
consents executed by the other parent or a third 
party whose consent is required for the 
adoption of the child may not be used by the 
parent whose consent was set aside to terminate 
or diminish the rights of the other parent or 
third party whose consent was required for the 
adoption of the child. 
 
(d) The consent to adoption or the affidavit of 
nonpaternity must be signed in the presence of 
two witnesses and be acknowledged before a 
notary public who is not signing as one of the 
witnesses. The notary public must legibly note 
on the consent or the affidavit the date and time 
of execution. The witnesses’ names must be 
typed or printed underneath their signatures. 
The witnesses’ home or business addresses 
must be included. The person who signs the 
consent or the affidavit has the right to have at 
least one of the witnesses be an individual who 
does not have an employment, professional, or 
personal relationship with the adoption entity or 
the prospective adoptive parents. The adoption 
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entity must give reasonable advance notice to 
the person signing the consent or affidavit of 
the right to select a witness of his or her own 
choosing. The person who signs the consent or 
affidavit must acknowledge in writing on the 
consent or affidavit that such notice was given 
and indicate the witness, if any, who was 
selected by the person signing the consent or 
affidavit. The adoption entity must include its 
name, address, and telephone number on the 
consent to adoption or affidavit of nonpaternity. 
 
(e) A consent to adoption being executed by the 
birthparent must be in at least 12-point 
boldfaced type and shall contain the following 
recitation of rights: 
 
CONSENT TO ADOPTION 
 
You have the right to select at least one person who does 
not have an employment, professional, or personal 
relationship with the adoption entity or the prospective 
adoptive parents to be present when this affidavit is 
executed and to sign it as a witness. You must acknowledge 
on this form that you were notified of this right and you 
must indicate the witness or witnesses you selected, if any. 
 
You do not have to sign this consent form. You may do any 
of the following instead of signing this consent or before 
signing this consent: 
1. Consult with an attorney; 
2. Hold, care for, and feed the child unless otherwise 
legally prohibited; 
3. Spend time alone with the child; 
4. Place the child in foster care or with any friend or 
family member you choose who is willing to care 
for the child; 
5. Take the child home unless otherwise legally 
prohibited; and, 
6. Find out about the community resources that are 
available to you if you do not go through with the 
adoption. 
 
If you do sign this consent, you are giving up all rights to 
your child. Your consent is valid, binding, and irrevocable 
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the moment you sign it except under specific legal 
circumstances. If you are giving up your rights to a 
newborn child who is to be immediately placed for adoption 
upon the child’s release from a licensed hospital or birth 
center following birth, a waiting period will be imposed 
upon the birthmother before she may sign the consent for 
adoption. A birthmother must wait 72 hours from the time 
of birth, or until the day the birthmother has been notified in 
writing, either on her patient chart or in release papers, that 
she is fit to be released from a licensed hospital or birth 
center, whichever is sooner, before the consent for adoption 
may be executed. The birthfather may execute consent at 
any time. Once you have signed the consent, it is valid, 
binding, and irrevocable and cannot be invalidated unless a 
court finds that it was obtained by fraud or duress. 
 
If you believe that your consent was obtained by fraud or 
duress and you wish to invalidate that consent, you must: 
1. Notify the adoption entity, by writing a letter, 
that you wish to withdraw your consent; and 
2. Prove in court that the consent was obtained by 
fraud or duress. 
 
COMMENTS 
Section (4) contains the timing provisions which have been the 
central focus of this Note.187 A birthmother may not give consent until 
seventy-two hours after the birth of the child.188 However, if the 
birthmother is released from the hospital before this time expires, she may 
give consent on the day of her release from the hospital.189 The birthfather 
may give his consent at any time, even before the birth of the child, 
provided that there is an adoption plan in place.190 This is intended to avoid 
situations where a birthfather attempts to relinquish his rights to avoid 
parenting and support obligations, which he is not allowed to do.191 It is 
also intended to provide certainty in the proceedings by ensuring that a 
birthfather’s consent or nonpaternity affidavit may be secured at any time 
that the adoption professional or birthmother is able to locate him. 
Consent by either parent is irrevocable upon execution.192 The only 
ground for invalidating or setting aside birthparent consent is on a court 
                                                
 187. Id. § 4(b). 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. § 4(a). 
 191. See, e.g., In re Ryan B., 686 S.E.2d 601, 605 (W. Va. 2009). 
 192. See infra APPENDIX B §§ 4(a), (b). 
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finding “that it was obtained by fraud or duress.”193 In the event that the 
consent of one birthparent is invalidated, the valid consent of the other 
birthparent may not be used against him or her by the birthparent who gave 
invalid consent or by a third party.194 
Sections (4)(d), (4)(e), and (5) contain procedural safeguards to 
reduce the possibility of fraud or coercion. For example, a birthparent 
consent must be executed in front of at least two witnesses and notarized, 
and the notary may not act as one of the witnesses.195 The birthparent may 
choose at least one of the witnesses,196 and must be informed in writing on 
the consent form itself of this right.197 Section (4)(d) provides what 
information must be included about the witnesses and the adoption agency 
on the consent itself.198 Section (4)(e) provides the text of the consent form, 
along with typeface restrictions.199 The form contains written notice to the 
birthparent of pertinent provisions of the statute, along with a procedure to 
follow if the birthparent believes he or she is being defrauded, and the 
following options: 
You do not have to sign this consent form. You may do any 
of the following instead of signing this consent or before 
signing this consent: 
1. Consult with an attorney; 
2. Hold, care for, and feed the child unless 
otherwise legally prohibited; 
3. Spend time alone with the child; 
4. Place the child in foster care or with any friend 
or family member you choose who is willing to 
care for the child; 
5. Take the child home unless otherwise legally 
prohibited; and, 
6. Find out about the community resources that are 
available to you if you do not go through with 
the adoption. 
 
If you do sign this consent, you are giving up all rights to 
your child. Your consent is valid, binding, and irrevocable 
the moment you sign it except under specific legal 
circumstances.200 
 
                                                
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. § 4(c). 
 195. Id. § 4(d). 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. § 4(e). 
 198. Id. § 4(d). 
 199. Id. § 4(e). 
 200. Id. 
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Section 5. 
(5) A copy or duplicate original of each consent signed in 
an action for termination of parental rights pending 
adoption must be provided to the person who executed 
the consent to adoption. The copy must be hand 
delivered, with a written acknowledgment of receipt 
signed by the person whose consent is required at the 
time of execution. If a copy of a consent cannot be 
provided as required in this subsection, the adoption 
entity must execute an affidavit stating why the copy of 
the consent was not delivered. The original consent and 
acknowledgment of receipt, or an affidavit stating why 
the copy of the consent was not delivered, must be filed 
with the petition for termination of parental rights 
pending adoption. 
 
COMMENTS 
Section (5) provides that the birthparent must be given a copy of 
the signed consent at the time of execution, or the adoption agency must 
provide to the court a written explanation in case a copy could not be 
provided.201 
 
Section 6. 
(6) Counseling. 
(a) Counseling of the birthmother is required in 
department, agency, and direct parental 
placement adoptions. If any other parent is 
involved in an adoptive placement, counseling 
of that parent is encouraged. 
 
(b) Counseling must be performed by a person 
employed by the department or by a staff 
person of a licensed child-placing agency 
designated to provide this type of counseling. 
Unless the counseling requirement is waived 
for good cause by a court, a minimum of 3 
hours of counseling must be completed prior to 
execution of a relinquishment of parental rights 
and consent to adopt. A relinquishment and 
consent to adopt executed prior to completion 
of required counseling is void. 
 
                                                
 201. Id. § 5. 
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(c) During counseling, the counselor shall offer an 
explanation of: 
1. adoption procedures and options that are 
available to a parent through the 
department or licensed child-placing 
agencies; 
2. adoption procedures and options that are 
available to a parent through direct 
parental placement adoptions, 
including the right to an attorney and 
that legal expenses are an allowable 
expense that may be paid by a 
prospective adoptive parent; 
3. the alternative of parenting rather than 
relinquishing the child for adoption; 
4. the resources that are available to 
provide assistance or support for the 
parent and the child if the parent 
chooses not to relinquish the child; 
5. the legal and personal effect and impact 
of terminating parental rights and of 
adoption; 
6. the options for contact and 
communication between the birth 
family and the adoptive family; 
7. postadoptive issues, including grief and 
loss, and the existence of a 
postadoptive counseling and support 
program; 
8. the fact that the adoptee may be provided 
with a copy of the original birth 
certificate upon request after reaching 
18 years of age, unless the birth parent 
has specifically requested in writing 
that the vital statistics bureau withhold 
release of the original birth certificate. 
 
(d) The counselor shall prepare a written report 
containing a description of the topics covered 
and the number of hours of counseling. The 
report must specifically include the counselor’s 
opinion of whether or not the parent understood 
all of the issues and was capable of informed 
consent. The report must, on request, be 
released to the person counseled, to the 
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department, to an agency, or with the consent 
of the person counseled, to an attorney for the 
prospective adoptive parents. 
 
COMMENTS 
At least three hours of pre-consent counseling for the birthmother 
are required in every adoption, and counseling is encouraged, but not 
required, for the birthfather.202 Who may counsel a birthparent203 and a list 
of issues that must be addressed are outlined in the statute, including 
procedural information, the legal significance of terminating parental rights, 
the emotional significance of terminating a parental relationship, the option 
of open adoption, the option to walk away from the adoption plan, and a list 
of available resources in case the birthmother decides to parent her child.204 
Finally, the counselor must provide to the court a written report outlining 
the counseling given.205 
B. Rationale 
The crucial provisions in this proposal are those that deal with the 
timing of consent and the disallowance of revocation. This Note has 
established in Part III why an abbreviated period of uncertainty is in the 
best interests of the child.206 The desires of the adoptive family are likewise 
served by reducing this window of time.207 But what needs to be 
emphasized is that brevity in delay of finality in the child’s status also 
serves birthparents well. While proponents of longer revocation periods 
believe that putting off the birthparents’ decision serves the birthparents’ 
interests, the opposite is almost certainly the case. Advocates for 
birthparents’ rights claim that hours or days after the birth of a child is too 
emotional a time to be making such life-changing decisions.208 Conceding 
that the emotions surrounding the birth of a child make it difficult to make a 
non-emotional decision, it is still not readily apparent that the situation 
improves dramatically with the passage of a little time. If a ten-day 
revocation period is better than a three-day revocation period for a 
birthmother’s peace of mind, then certainly by the same logic a twenty-one-
day period, or a thirty-day period, or a ninety-day period would be vastly 
superior. But the longer the statutory revocation period, the greater the 
threat to the stability, permanence, and continuity of the adoptive family 
unit. A degree of uncertainty and anxiety will be present in the adoptive 
                                                
 202. Id. §§ 6(a), (b). 
 203. Id. § 6(b). 
 204. Id. § 6(c). 
 205. Id. § 6(d). 
 206. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 44, at 43. 
 207. Cahn, Family Issue(s), supra note 48, at 271. 
 208. Samuels, supra note 43, at 545. 
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home until the day the family can breathe a collective sigh of relief: The 
new baby is finally “one of us.” If a three-day window for the birthmother 
to change her mind forces her to make a decision in the midst of a very 
trying and emotional time, does a ten-day window really rectify that 
situation? And with whom is the child bonding and identifying as mom in 
the interim? 
It would seem consistent with the interests of both birthparents to 
have made a final, rational decision before the emotions of childbirth add to 
the confusion in what, in most cases, is already a tough situation.209 This is 
true even if the state does not allow for consent to be given until after birth 
in the case of the mother, allowing for consent to be given by the father at 
any time. Except in the rare case, consent is given willingly and voluntarily. 
In cases where fraud or duress is present, no state withholds the right to 
challenge consent as being invalid, whether it is subject to revocation or 
not.210 Under the proposed approach, counseling and advice are mandated 
by statute and paid for by the prospective adoptive parents in an effort to 
aid the informed decision of the birthparents. In giving voluntary consent, 
the birthparents have presumably already thoughtfully considered their 
options. It would be the rare case indeed where the life circumstances that 
precipitated a birthmother seeking out an adoption plan, going through nine 
months of pregnancy, deciding to relinquish her parental rights and working 
with the birthfather to relinquish his parental rights, whatever those 
circumstances may be, have changed so drastically in the few days or 
weeks after signing consent that revocation is in the birthparents’ interest. 
Rather, finality in the process and the birthparents’ interests are better 
served when the decision made is as untainted as possible by emotion and 
the possibility of putting the decision off until later in an already difficult 
situation.211 
CONCLUSION 
It is the case that, contrary to popular wisdom, no one’s interests 
are advanced by prolonging the process of finalization of an adoption plan. 
Both sets of parents—those who are connected to the child through biology 
and those who may ultimately end up providing the child with a lifetime of 
care and a family in which to belong—benefit from the finality, 
permanency, and predictability of a firm decision, once a decision is made. 
But of foremost importance, as the child’s future hangs in the balance, it is 
                                                
 209. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 44, at 43. 
 210. See infra APPENDIX A. 
 211. For example, according to the Florida Legislature, “[a]n unmarried mother faced 
with the responsibility of making crucial decisions about the future of a newborn child is 
entitled to privacy, has the right to make timely and appropriate decisions regarding her 
future and the future of the child, and is entitled to assurance regarding an adoptive 
placement.” FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.022 (1)(b) (West, WestlawNext through 2013 First Reg. 
Sess.) (emphasis added). 
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to his or her needs that we must first attend. And the child’s interests are 
clearly better served by finality, regardless of which family she ends up 
calling her own. 
Viewed in this light, there is clearly no room for revocation periods 
in the adoption process. Relinquishment of parental rights should not be 
entered into lightly. Birthparents should take as much time as they need to 
make such a momentous decision. Statutory minimum waiting periods 
before consent can be given after birth help to ensure that birthparents are 
afforded an opportunity to reflect, even after the pre-birth decision has been 
made, and to understand that no one is expecting them to agree to an 
adoption plan against their will. But this period must also be kept to a 
minimum in the child’s interest, to avoid foster care and needless ambiguity 
in the child’s status. Adoptive parents, social workers, and adoption 
professionals must be patient and understanding, allowing birthparents the 
breathing room they need to make a final decision. But in the end, the child 
will need someone to care for him or her, and the final decision must be 
final. 
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APPENDIX B: PROPOSED STATUTE 
§ 1 Consent. 
 
(a) Consent to an adoption or an affidavit of nonpaternity shall be 
executed as follows: 
1. If by an agency, by affidavit from its authorized 
representative. 
2. If by any other person, in the presence of the court or by 
affidavit acknowledged before a notary public and in 
the presence of two witnesses. 
3. If by a court, by an appropriate order or certificate of the 
court. 
 
(b) A minor parent has the power to consent to the adoption of his 
or her child and has the power to relinquish his or her control or 
custody of the child to an adoption entity. Such consent or 
relinquishment is valid and has the same force and effect as a 
consent or relinquishment executed by an adult parent. A minor 
parent, having executed a consent or relinquishment, may not 
revoke that consent upon reaching the age of majority or 
otherwise becoming emancipated. 
 
(c) A consent or an affidavit of nonpaternity executed by a minor 
parent who is 14 years of age or younger must be witnessed by 
a parent, legal guardian, or court-appointed guardian ad litem. 
 
(d) The notice and consent provisions of this chapter as they relate 
to the father of a child do not apply in cases in which the child 
is conceived as a result of a violation of the criminal laws of 
this or another state or country, including, but not limited to, 
sexual battery, unlawful sexual activity with certain minors, 
lewd acts perpetrated upon a minor, or incest. 
 
§ 2 A consent that does not name or otherwise identify the adopting parent 
is valid if the consent contains a statement by the person consenting 
that the consent was voluntarily executed and that identification of the 
adopting parent is not required for granting the consent. 
 
§ 3 Availability of Persons Required to Give Consent. 
 
(a) A good faith and diligent effort must be made to have each 
parent whose identity is known and whose consent is required 
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interviewed by a representative of the adoption entity before 
the consent is executed. A summary of each interview, or a 
statement that the parent is unidentified, unlocated, or 
unwilling or unavailable to be interviewed, must be filed with 
the petition to terminate parental rights pending adoption. The 
interview may be excused by the court for good cause. 
 
(b) If any person who is required to consent is unavailable because 
the person cannot be located, an affidavit of diligent search 
shall be filed. 
 
(c) If any person who is required to consent is unavailable because 
the person is deceased, the petition to terminate parental rights 
pending adoption must be accompanied by a certified copy of 
the death certificate. 
 
§ 4 Execution Procedure, Timing, and Irrevocability. 
 
(a) An affidavit of nonpaternity may be executed before the birth of 
the child; however, the consent to an adoption may not be 
executed before the birth of the child except in a preplanned 
adoption. An affidavit of nonpaternity may be set aside only if 
the court finds that the affidavit was obtained by fraud or 
duress. 
 
(b) A consent to the adoption of a child who is to be placed for 
adoption may be executed by the birthmother 72 hours after the 
child’s birth or the day the birthmother is notified in writing, 
either on her patient chart or in release paperwork, that she is fit 
to be released from the licensed hospital or birth center, 
whichever is earlier. A consent by the birthfather may be 
executed at any time. The consent is valid upon execution and 
may be withdrawn only if the court finds that it was obtained 
by fraud or duress. 
 
(c) If the consent of one parent is set aside in accordance with this 
chapter, any other consents executed by the other parent or a 
third party whose consent is required for the adoption of the 
child may not be used by the parent whose consent was set 
aside to terminate or diminish the rights of the other parent or 
third party whose consent was required for the adoption of the 
child. 
 
(d) The consent to adoption or the affidavit of nonpaternity must be 
signed in the presence of two witnesses and be acknowledged 
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before a notary public who is not signing as one of the 
witnesses. The notary public must legibly note on the consent 
or the affidavit the date and time of execution. The witnesses’ 
names must be typed or printed underneath their signatures. 
The witnesses’ home or business addresses must be included. 
The person who signs the consent or the affidavit has the right 
to have at least one of the witnesses be an individual who does 
not have an employment, professional, or personal relationship 
with the adoption entity or the prospective adoptive parents. 
The adoption entity must give reasonable advance notice to the 
person signing the consent or affidavit of the right to select a 
witness of his or her own choosing. The person who signs the 
consent or affidavit must acknowledge in writing on the 
consent or affidavit that such notice was given and indicate the 
witness, if any, who was selected by the person signing the 
consent or affidavit. The adoption entity must include its name, 
address, and telephone number on the consent to adoption or 
affidavit of nonpaternity. 
 
(e) A consent to adoption being executed by the birthparent must be 
in at least 12-point boldfaced type and shall contain the 
following recitation of rights: 
 
CONSENT TO ADOPTION 
 
You have the right to select at least one person who does not have an 
employment, professional, or personal relationship with the adoption entity 
or the prospective adoptive parents to be present when this affidavit is 
executed and to sign it as a witness. You must acknowledge on this form 
that you were notified of this right and you must indicate the witness or 
witnesses you selected, if any. 
 
You do not have to sign this consent form. You may do any of the 
following instead of signing this consent or before signing this consent: 
1. Consult with an attorney; 
2. Hold, care for, and feed the child unless otherwise legally 
prohibited; 
3. Spend time alone with the child; 
4. Place the child in foster care or with any friend or family 
member you choose who is willing to care for the child; 
5. Take the child home unless otherwise legally prohibited; and, 
6. Find out about the community resources that are available to you 
if you do not go through with the adoption. 
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If you do sign this consent, you are giving up all rights to your child. Your 
consent is valid, binding, and irrevocable the moment you sign it except 
under specific legal circumstances. If you are giving up your rights to a 
newborn child who is to be immediately placed for adoption upon the 
child’s release from a licensed hospital or birth center following birth, a 
waiting period will be imposed upon the birthmother before she may sign 
the consent for adoption. A birthmother must wait 72 hours from the time 
of birth, or until the day the birthmother has been notified in writing, either 
on her patient chart or in release papers, that she is fit to be released from a 
licensed hospital or birth center, whichever is sooner, before the consent for 
adoption may be executed. The birthfather may execute consent at any 
time. Once you have signed the consent, it is valid, binding, and irrevocable 
and cannot be invalidated unless a court finds that it was obtained by fraud 
or duress. 
 
If you believe that your consent was obtained by fraud or duress and you 
wish to invalidate that consent, you must: 
1. Notify the adoption entity, by writing a letter, that you wish to 
withdraw your consent; and 
2. Prove in court that the consent was obtained by fraud or duress. 
 
§ 5 A copy or duplicate original of each consent signed in an action for 
termination of parental rights pending adoption must be provided to the 
person who executed the consent to adoption. The copy must be hand 
delivered, with a written acknowledgment of receipt signed by the 
person whose consent is required at the time of execution. If a copy of a 
consent cannot be provided as required in this subsection, the adoption 
entity must execute an affidavit stating why the copy of the consent was 
not delivered. The original consent and acknowledgment of receipt, or 
an affidavit stating why the copy of the consent was not delivered, must 
be filed with the petition for termination of parental rights pending 
adoption. 
 
§ 6 Counseling. 
 
(a) Counseling of the birthmother is required in department, 
agency, and direct parental placement adoptions. If any other 
parent is involved in an adoptive placement, counseling of that 
parent is encouraged. 
 
(b) Counseling must be performed by a person employed by the 
department or by a staff person of a licensed child-placing 
agency designated to provide this type of counseling. Unless 
the counseling requirement is waived for good cause by a court, 
a minimum of 3 hours of counseling must be completed prior to 
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execution of a relinquishment of parental rights and consent to 
adopt. A relinquishment and consent to adopt executed prior to 
completion of required counseling is void. 
 
(c) During counseling, the counselor shall offer an explanation of: 
1. adoption procedures and options that are available to a 
parent through the department or licensed child-placing 
agencies; 
2. adoption procedures and options that are available to a 
parent through direct parental placement adoptions, 
including the right to an attorney and that legal 
expenses are an allowable expense that may be paid by 
a prospective adoptive parent; 
3. the alternative of parenting rather than relinquishing the 
child for adoption; 
4. the resources that are available to provide assistance or 
support for the parent and the child if the parent 
chooses not to relinquish the child; 
5. the legal and personal effect and impact of terminating 
parental rights and of adoption; 
6. the options for contact and communication between the 
birth family and the adoptive family; 
7. postadoptive issues, including grief and loss, and the 
existence of a postadoptive counseling and support 
program; 
8. the fact that the adoptee may be provided with a copy of 
the original birth certificate upon request after reaching 
18 years of age, unless the birth parent has specifically 
requested in writing that the vital statistics bureau 
withhold release of the original birth certificate. 
 
(d) The counselor shall prepare a written report containing a 
description of the topics covered and the number of hours of 
counseling. The report must specifically include the 
counselor’s opinion of whether or not the parent understood all 
of the issues and was capable of informed consent. The report 
must, on request, be released to the person counseled, to the 
department, to an agency, or with the consent of the person 
counseled, to an attorney for the prospective adoptive parents. 
 
